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The timeliness of another look at the devel-
opment prospects and policy options for Latin 
America can hardly be disputed. Another shock 
from a significant increase in the price of 
petroleum is adding to the burdens of a world 
economy already mired in stagflation. The 
recent UNCTAD meeting has not produced a 
common programme for accelerating and 
spreading economic development: on the 
contrary, divisions among and between the 
industrialized and developing nations have 
widened. Even the conclusion of the Tokyo 
Round has failed to evoke enthusiasm among 
the Group of 77. 
For all the failure to seize upon its pos-
sibilities, however, economic interdepen-
dence remains more than rhetoric, and for no 
part of the developing world is this truer than 
Latin America. The countries of the region 
substantially increased their integration into 
the world economy at the end of the 1960s and 
the beginning of the 1970s. Growth rates of 
their trade were superior to those of the gross 
domest ic product, which were themselves 
accelerating. Terms of trade were favourable. 
Capital flows increased dramatically. 
Since 1973, as the industrialized countries 
have performed less well, with corresponding 
reduction in the growth of trade, the regional 
statistics have mirrored the global adjustment 
problem. For all the success —in large measure 
unexpected— that the private banks have had 
in recycling the surpluses of the OPEC coun-
tries, the transfer of the extra petroleum reve-
nue has not gone smoothly. This was true even 
as the O P E C surplus diminished from US$ 40 
billion to some US$ 10 billion in 1978, and 
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before the substantial increase now in prospect 
again. 
Statistics for Latin America as a whole, of 
course, conceal the significant differences that 
have emerged between the oil-exporting and 
non-oil-exporting countries of the region. Of 
the latter, sixteen experienced lower growth 
in the period 1974-1978 than in the prior 1970-
1974 period, and only three smaller countries 
(Honduras, Paraguay and Uruguay) registered 
an improved performance. In contrast, the oil 
exporters showed tangible gains, and even 
Ecuador —the only country not to gain mar-
kedly relative to the earlier period— nonethe-
less grew at one of the highest rates of the 
region, 6.8%. 
The regional growth rate, heavily domi-
nated by the non-oil-exporters, is in itself an 
obvious source of concern, sinking from a post-
war high of 7.5% in 1970-1974 to 4.0% in 1974-
1978. The current average is lower than that of 
the stagnant early 1960s, which provoked such 
concern. Slowing and uneven growth has been 
accompanied by generalized inflationary pres-
sures. Excluding the extreme experiences of 
Argentina and Chile, consumer prices have 
climbed at more than 30% a year recently, 
compared to less than half this rate in 1970-
1973. In short, even if we include the gains of 
its oil producers the Latin American economy 
has not fared well in the unsettled post-1973 
circumstances, and this conclusion applies all 
the more when comparison is made with the 
performance of other developing countries. 
What makes the Latin American experi-
ence of special concern is that this post-1973 
decline in growth and resurgence of inflation 
have taken place despite record capital flows 
exceeding those to other areas. During the 
period 1974-1978 the non-oil-exporting coun-
tries of the region increased their indebtedness 
by some US$ 60 billion. As an order of magni-
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tude, this capital inflow should be compared 
with a total cost of petroleum imports of less 
that US$ 30 billion and an incremental cost of 
petroleum imports of about US$ 20 billion. To 
put it another way, and more comprehensively, 
the capital flow was sufficient to sustain the 
same 9.6% rate of increase of the purchasing 
power of exports experienced in the extraor-
dinary 1970-1973 period. Thus it substantially 
compensated for both diminished volume and 
terms-of-trade effects. 
It is difficult to sustain, therefore, that 
Latin America has suffered from inadequate 
access to foreign capital markets. Despite the 
substantial access it has enjoyed, however, the 
consequences have not been entirely satisfac-
tory. While it is correct to argue that the pay-
ments deficits of Latin America, and of the 
developing countries generally, have provided 
a necessary counterpart to the OPEC sur-
pluses, one should not exaggerate the effi-
ciency of the transfer process. 
In looking ahead to the renewed imbal-
ance in global finances that is imminent, it is 
important to appreciate both the limitations 
and the possibilities inherent in the strategy of 
debt-finance adjustment which some countries 
in Latin America have opted for. The sections 
below address this fundamental issue from 
different perspectives. Section I considers the 
characteristics of recent capital inflow, sources 
as well as uses. Section II examines the capital 
requirements for continuing economic ex-
pansion in the region, as well as the means for 
meeting them, and attention is also given to 
some of the suggestions that have been made 
regarding ways to confront future capital needs 
more adequately. Section III considers the 
domestic side of integration into international 
capital markets and notes that reliance upon 
external capital inflows is not neutral in its 
consequences for internal policies. 
The pattern of debt accumulation 
The dimensions of the capital inflow into Latin 
America are tolerably clear from recent re-
search on the subject. The disbursed debt of 
the non-oil-exporting countries now exceeds 
US$ 100 billion —roughly two-thirds official 
and one-third provided without government 
guarantee. Brazil and Mexico together ac-
count for some 70% of the regional total. The 
Brazilian debt stands at around US$ 40 billion, 
and the Mexican close to US$ 30 billion. Ar-
gentina, with a debt of US$ 10 billion, and 
Colombia, Chile and Peru, each in the range 
from US$ 5-US$ 8 billion, trail far behind. 
That debt has increased more than eight 
times from its 1965 level, and more rapidly than 
for the developing countries as a whole. Debt 
has become the principal form of capital inflow 
into the region, and direct investment, which a 
decade ago provided almost as much resources, 
now accounts for little more than 10% of the 
capital inflow. Multinational enterprises have 
increasingly financed their requirements 
through bank indebtedness abroad rather than 
by resort to internal credits or to equity. 
Accompanying the shift to debt finance has 
been a much greater role for private rather than 
public sources of credit. Commercial banks in 
particular have become the principal creditors. 
They have now become responsible for more 
than 40% of the officially guaranteed debt, 
compared to less than 10% little more than a 
decade ago, and with the rise in the importance 
of non-guaranteed debt, supplied almost ex-
clusively as bank credit, their participation 
must stand at close to 70% of the total out-
standing debt. Estimates for 1978 suggest a 
partial retreat from the proportions of the 1974-
1977 period, partly for that very reason. 
These capital inflows over that last decade 
cannot usefully be viewed as forming a single 
process of debt accumulation, but seem rather 
to correspond to three distint sets of circum-
stances. The first period, approximately from 
1970 to 1973, is one of the initiation of access 
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to the rapidly growing Eurocurrency market. 
Supply, in the form of bank discovery of the 
profitability of application of resources in the 
middle-income countries, vied with demand. 
Increasing investment coefficients meant 
increasing need for imports of capital goods, 
and consequently for foreign exchange. At the 
beginning, despite buoyant exports and fa-
vourable prices, import requirements ex-
ceeded import capacity —hence the attractive-
ness of finance available for reasonable periods 
and at low interest rates owing to an excess of 
investible funds. In 1972 and 1973, however, 
the extraordinary rise in the prices of com-
modity exports increased the value of exports 
by more than 60%, thus providing a much 
larger supply of foreign exchange, and the 
continuing inflow of loans was substantially 
applied to the accumulation of reserves rather 
than to offsetting the current account deficit. 
I have labelled this early period prior to 
1974 one of debt-led growth, in order to em-
phasize the positive relationship between the 
flow of external capital and the acceleration in 
real growth of the product. In the early 1970s 
such supplementation of foreign exchange 
made it feasible to adopt high growth strategies 
without fear of foreign exchange constraints. 
The years 1974 and 1975, in contrast, are 
those of debt-financed accomodation to the oil 
price increase. As a result of the increased 
demand for loans, interest rates rose percep-
tibly and maturities shortened. The purchasing 
power of exports fell sharply in both years 
owing to increasing prices of petroleum and 
other imports, while the volume of exports 
stagnated. Import capacity was sustained by 
resorting to the external market to finance un-
precedentedly high deficits on current ac-
count. So substantial were the needs that there 
was even some modest depletion of reserves. 
The net effect was virtually uninterrupted 
growth in 1974, but perceptible reduction in 
1975. Nonetheless, the performance in those 
two years, taken together, did not compare 
unfavourably with longer-term trends, and in 
both years the investment coefficient con-
tinued to rise. 
The almost US$ 30 billion in current 
account deficits of the Latin American non-oil-
exporting countries was largely offset from the 
surpluses accumulated by the OPEC countries. 
These balances found their way for the most 
part to the Eurocurrency market, where they 
were intermediated by the banks. Non all 
developing countries were equally fortunate, 
however. The lowest-income countries, whose 
growth rates had failed to respond favourably 
in the earlier period, did not have access to the 
new resources, and their unhappy alternative 
consisted of still slower rates of expansion and 
reliance upon public capital made available for 
the most needy, 
Other countries, notably Korea and Tai-
wan, responded by accepting an immediate 
reduction in growth, and undertook diversion 
of production to the export market. This, of 
course, is the means by which the real income 
loss due to the adverse change in the terms of 
trade is palliated by translating it into reduced 
domestic absorption. While possible for some 
countries, it is not a solution for all simulta-
neously unless total world income were to fall 
significantly. 
The large economies of Latin America 
opted for a third course —one of using the 
capital market to sustain domestic expenditure. 
They did so in part because private commercial 
banks effectively recycled the new petro-
dollars by making borrowing attractive. Latin 
American countries already in debt had an 
easier time obtaining more. But such differ-
ential access is not the only reason. Clearly 
there were important political advantages in 
seeking to sustain higher rates of growth that 
had recently given such striking advantages, 
and in avoiding economic recession or worse. 
This combination of circumstances led Latin 
America to emerge as an even larger participant 
in the capital market after 1974, and the two 
largest developing-country debtors to com-
mercial banks became Brazil and Mexico. 
A third period, after 1975, should also be 
distinguished. It has been marked by sub-
stantially reduced current account deficits 
compared with the 1974-1975 levels, the 1978 
level in real terms —deflating for both inflation 
and real product growth— being less than half 
the 1975 peak. In addition, the composition of 
the deficit has changed, and whereas it was 
made up almost entirely of net payments of 
profits and interest in 1977 and 1978, in 1975 
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these formed only a third of it. The last three 
years have therefore seen a delayed adjustment 
to the altered external conditions prevalent 
since 1974: a rise in the rate of growth of ex-
ports, virtual constancy in import volume, a 
reduction in the rate of growth to less than 5%, 
and a lower investment coefficient. 
Yet this last period has also seen an actual 
expansion of foreign borrowing rather than a 
reduction. Massive increases of reserves ex-
plain this apparent contradiction. The non-oil-
exporting countries are responsible for an 
accumulation of more US$ 17 billion in re-
serves in the last three years, and almost half of 
the increment in debt has been used for this 
purpose. Much of the rest, in turn, has gone to 
compensate for the outflow of service pay-
ments on prior direct investment and indebt-
edness . Far from financing a necessary supply 
of imports essential to continued growth, real 
external resource transfer has sharply declined. 
Foreign borrowing satisfies domestic credit 
requirements rather than foreign exchange 
needs, and large international reserves create 
domestic monetary policy problems as well as 
complicating management of the debt. These 
reserves have become offsetting deposits feed-
ing back into the Eurocurrency market, earning 
lower rates of interest, and of limited con-
vertibility to material imports because of credi-
tor apprehension. 
For many of the countries of Latin Ameri-
ca, therefore, the debt cycle threatens to come 
full circle in little more than a decade —from a 
process of debt-led growth to one of potentially 
debt-constrained growth. Foreign capital in-
flow, while staving off some of the worst con-
sequences of the new world economic situation 
since 1974, has not been a panacea. 
II 
Capital requirements 
This record accumulation of debt in Latin 
American and other developing countries has 
not gone unnoticed. Initial concern by some 
in 1974 and 1975 lest the entire world financial 
structure crash on account of generalized in-
capacity to repay has quite correctly abated, 
and more optimistic forecasts, showing how 
the record current account deficits of 1974 and 
1975 would moderate and involving adjust-
ments for inflation and product growth to 
assess more accurately the extent of indebted-
ness, have proved better founded. 
Yet it is too soon to dismiss the debt 
problem entirely. It is clear from the expe-
rience of recent years in Latin America —even 
before the present petroleum shortage— that 
the inflow of increasingly private capital has 
not been performing its intended function. 
Potential savings both in the direct form of 
O P E C surpluses, and indirectly in the form of 
lesser investment in the industrialized coun-
tries, have not been translated into capital 
formation and sustained economic growth. 
Resources have not been allocated to those 
whose return was highest, but rather to those 
whose needs were less. That is, of course, one 
of the ironies of commercial-bank evaluation 
of creditworthiness: those who accumulate 
reserves are the best customers. 
Underlying this failure of the market to 
produce more positive results is the reliance 
on a short-term, private profit motive criterion. 
Commercial banks could hardly be asked to 
function otherwise, since they have no pre-
tensions of serving as development banks, 
and neither could the recipients. Each country, 
facing an uncertain supply of credit, could 
hardly risk larger current account deficits, 
given the short maturity of its large outstand-
ing liabilities. It is not surprising, then, that 
Latin American growth rates and investment 
coefficients should decline and that the build-
ing up of reserves should be a favoured ap-
plication of borrowing—and a key to continued 
access. 
Furthermore, the optimistic assessments 
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t end to look backward rather than forward. 
Whether the calculations on which they are 
based involve deflating the debt by rising 
export prices, or extrapolating diminishing 
current account deficits, they fundamentally 
err in failing to tackle the question of the future 
means of meeting foreign exchange needs. 
While export prices may rise, so do import 
prices. The real problem for non-oil-exporting 
countries since 1974 has been the combination 
of inflation and adverse terms-of-trade move-
ments. Moreover, global inflation also means 
higher and immediately adjustable interest 
costs on debt of shorter average term. While we 
have seen that current account deficits for Latin 
America have indeed declined, we have also 
noted the lesser real transfer of resources 
consequent upon the rising incidence of in-
terest and profit payments. 
Once one projects forward to ascertain the 
capital inflows that will be needed, the es-
sential characteristics of the Latin American 
debt problem become clearer. Firstly, the debt 
over next decade is likely to increase by a 
significant multiple, and more rapidly than 
gross national product. Gross inflows will have 
to rise even more in order to cope with amor-
tization. Secondly, the ratio of service pay-
ments to exports is likely to increase further in 
the near future from its current average of more 
than 40% before stabilizing. Thirdly, the gain 
to debtor countries from inflation should not 
be exaggerated. Such a gain does exist, because 
price increases magnify the dollar merchandise 
surplus that can be used for amortization and 
service payments denominated at historical 
cost, but as the maturity of the debt shortens, 
and as interest rates reflect inflation —as they 
must with increased reliance upon commercial 
bank loans— this advantage is curtailed. More 
significant than inflation per se are the terms 
of trade, because they have a greater effect 
upon the size of the commercial balance. In 
crude terms, on the basis of a variety of actual 
projections using parameters appropriate to the 
Latin American experience, a one percentage 
point improvement in the terms of trade is 
equivalent to three percentage points of gen-
eralized inflation. 
Fourthly, capacity to cope with the size of 
the deb t and its servicing requirements de-
pends critically upon real export growth rates 
that exceed the growth of the domestic product, 
that is to say, it depends upon an increase in 
the importance of the external market. Import 
substitution can help in increasing the com-
mercial balance, but cannot be relied upon to 
the extent it was formerly. At the low ratio of 
imports to income that the larger countries 
now have, there is a limit beyond which the 
import elasticity cannot be pushed. Moreover, 
as one approaches that limit and relies upon 
import reduction to equilibrate capital needs, 
there is no further flexibility for economic 
policy: a decline in foreign exchange for any 
reason automatically becomes a serious econo-
mic constraint, whereas at higher levels of 
exports and imports there is more room for 
restricting less essential imports. Furthermore, 
an export-promotion policy reaps the gains of a 
much larger market and, if correctly pursued, 
stimulates increased productivity in response 
to the rigours of international competition, 
whereas an import-substitution policy runs the 
risks of excess protectionism and inefficiency. 
Fifthly, the growing export surplus re-
quired to slow reliance on external capital in-
flow calls for a corresponding reduction in 
domestic expenditures. National savings must 
rise as a counterpart to the resources trans-
ferred from abroad earlier. One can postpone, 
but not avoid, the real income consequences 
of the higher petroleum prices, and the ques-
tion of how to allocate that cost internally, as 
surpluses are transferred externally, is not a 
trivial matter. 
Finally, and most important, a more causal 
projection structure makes it clear that the real 
cost of repayment of the debt under adverse 
trend and financial conditions is lowered 
economic growth. Foreign exchange must be 
allocated to service past inflows of capital 
rather than to purchase imported inputs es-
sential to sustained capital accumulation. At 
low rates of continuing capital inflow and of 
exports there is a trade-off between adjustment 
in the current account deficit and economic 
performance. The debt problem is far from 
exclusively a creditor's problem, and it be-
comes an impossible one if creditors simulta-
neously choose to close off both capital and 
merchandise markets. 
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raise legitimate doubts in this direction— they 
are not a necessary concomitant of rising 
exports. It would be unfortunate, as more 
democratic tendencies stir in a number of 
countries, for nationalist, inward-looking de-
velopment to become synonymous with an 
economic policy more responsive to popular 
needs . The reality is that import substitution, 
domestic austerity fairly distributed, and con-
tinuing capital inflow must all be coupled 
with aggressive efforts to increase exports. 
The great bulk of these exports, moreover, 
will have to be directed to the market outside 
Latin America rather than within. Just as the 
shortages of foreign exchange in the late 1950s 
stimulated the creation of the Latin American 
Free Trade Association, so again there are 
suggestions that an expanded regional market 
may contribute to the solution. A recent 
CEPAL publication, for example, took the 
view that Latin America will now undoubt-
edly have to place more emphasis on intra-
regional trade. Without denying the growth of 
intra-regional trade in recent years and its 
more than proportional significance in the 
field of manufactures, however, it seems to me 
unlikely that the formal integration process 
will much accelerate in the next several years 
unless two conditions are met: reversal of the 
diminishing regional political identity which 
has characterized Latin America in the last 
decade; and much slower growth of trade 
opportunities outside the region. A Latin 
American Common Market is more likely to 
have its origins in circumstances external to the 
region than to arise spontaneously from within. 
Even then, the capacity to bridge the signifi-
cant differences between oil exporters and oil 
importers, large economies and small, ad-
vanced and lower-income countries, etc., 
seems to me doubtful. Intra-regional exports 
may contribute to the solution, but only to a 
limited extent. 
Apart from assuring a continuing allocation 
of resources to exports, domestic policies must 
seek better to accommodate the external and 
internal capital markets. During the period of 
rapid debt accumulation, the restructuring of 
internal capital markets has been given sec-
ondary priority, since external credit has 
substi tuted for the need to capture domestic 
savings. The distribution of such credit is, of 
course, non-neutral. It favours larger enter-
prises relative to smaller; governmental rela-
tive to private; industry relative to agriculture; 
multinational firms relative to national. Gov-
ernment policies often seek to offset such 
biases, but at the cost of compartmentalizing 
the internal capital market still further. Those 
sectors receiving subsidies suffer from a short-
age of real investment as loans are applied 
elsewhere. 
This impact of capital inflow upon domes-
tic financial institutions must be a matter of 
greater concern. There is no simple equaliza-
tion of internal and external interest rates, as a 
simple theoretical model suggests. Moreover, 
as is well known, external savings are not a 
pure supplement to national savings, but to a 
considerable degree displace and substitute 
for them. Failure to take these structural con-
sequences into account biases an otherwise 
rational calculus in favour of a larger resort to 
debt than may be necessary. In recent years, 
when foreign exchange requirements have 
been less pressing and debt has had such a 
large counterpart in reserves, these financial 
effects loom larger. 
This accumulation of reserves has led to 
wider appreciation of the limits imposed upon 
domestic monetary and fiscal policy by inte-
gration into international capital markets. It 
is a measure of the excessive reliance upon 
debt that efforts have been made to sterilize 
the monetary increases resulting from even 
greater reserves. Far from the capital flows 
being an equilibrating mechanism, they threat-
en the effective management of the domestic 
economy. External credit must be neutralized 
by government sales of securities. It is not an 
easy operation —and one that more often than 
not has led to larger increases in the money 
supply than were desired or planned. This 
avenue of imported and magnified inflation 
has been an important component in the price 
rises of the largest regional debtor, Brazil. In 
undertaking such sales of securities with 
monetary correction it should be noted, more-
over, that government nominal expenditures 
are given a significant upward impulse. 
Apart from these effects on monetary and 
fiscal policy, there is a further constraint upon 
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of long-term funds by offering protection 
against inflation; encouraging commercial 
banks to intermediate some of their resources 
through public institutions, perhaps initially 
through some swap arrangement; creation of 
new public institutions directed to particular 
investment objectives in which there is a 
common global interest: agriculture, substitute 
sources of energy, natural resources. 
These proposals share a common feature. 
They presume that the problem for Latin 
America is not a need for concessional re-
sources but for more certain and longer-term 
funds on which social returns are high enough 
to offset interest costs. They also presume that 
exclusively regional arrangements —whether 
a short-term safety net or longer-term guaran-
t ee schemes— are not likely to be as efficacious 
International capital flows must also be related 
back to the domestic economy. Three inter-
faces require brief comment in this respect. 
One is the ability to sustain the growth of 
exports needed to satisfy foreign exchange 
requirements . The second is the interaction 
be tween internal and international capital 
markets. The third is the interrelationship 
be tween debt management and domestic 
monetary and fiscal policies. 
The progressive reintegration of many of 
the principal countries of Latin America into 
the world market at the end of the 1960s and 
beginning of the 1970s is well documented, 
as is the rising share of manufactures in total 
exports. Both the favourable growth of the 
world economy and domestic policies reducing 
biases against the external market contributed 
to this. In some cases, both significant sub-
sidies and more favourable exchange rates 
were offered; that was clearly true in Brazil, for 
example, although the subsidies were to a large 
extent only compensatory for the combination 
of tariffs and exchange-rate overvaluation. 
Such policies of frank export promotion 
as more universal arrangements that satisfy 
special Latin American needs. 
Finally, they focus on measures directly 
relating to capital flows. This is not to ignore 
that the debt problem is in the last analysis a 
trade problem. Quite to the contrary. Without 
high growth of exports, these measures re-
quired in the capital markets would be quite 
inadequate. Unless the means are provided to 
sell exports in a volume sufficient to meet 
foreign exchange obligations, the alternatives 
are either lower Latin American (and world) 
growth or massive and more certain capital 
transfers. The former is unacceptable; the 
latter, unlikely. That is why the subject of 
capital flows is inextricably linked to that of 
real flows. 
may have been easier to sustain than the com-
bination of import substitution and growing 
exports now advocated. They were easier be-
cause they were accompanied by high rates of 
growth of imports, and hence rapid expansion 
of domestic absorption. They were easier be-
cause integration into a buoyant world econo-
my yielded tangible benefits in the shape of 
more rapid growth of the product. They were 
easier because they did not involve, as in 
recent years, heightened tariffs and quantita-
tive restrictions against imports, with simulta-
neous complaints about protectionism in the 
industrialized countries. 
Latin American commitment to the ex-
ternal market runs against deep sentiments to 
the contrary. An export orientation is feared as 
ánti-industrialization, anti-national enterprise, 
and anti-more equitable income distribution. 
All of these concerns have their roots in his-
torical experience. Yet it would be a sad mis-
take to extrapolate the past to the future. While 
particular policies to exploit the external mar-
ket may have such features —and the proposals 
in Brazil to reorient the agricultural sector 
III 
Domestic implications and policies 
54 CEPAL REVIEW No. 10 / April 1980 
I have emphasized these qualitative con-
clusions here rather than present a specific set 
of estimated capital requirements, because 
these considerations seem to me the more 
relevant context against which to evaluate 
different policy proposals. Particular values 
will change with altered circumstances. The 
additional cost of oil this year, for example, as 
well as higher interest rates, will alone add 
more than US$ 4 billion to the current account 
deficit registered last year, reversing its trend 
reduction. 
These developments make all the more 
desirable a concerted effort to tackle the in-
adequacies of a capital flow monitored almost 
exclusively by the private market. Corrective 
measures should fall into two broad categories: 
conversion of a much larger proportion of 
current debt into long-term borrowing, and 
more effective means of coping with short-
term shortfalls of foreign exchange. The aim of 
both these measures is to permit external 
resources to be used to better advantage, 
thereby stimulating growth not only within 
Latin America but also for the industrialized 
countries. 
Bank borrowing through the Eurocurrency 
market, as we have seen, has in recent years 
failed to fulfill this objective. Foreign re-
sources have been applied to reserve ac-
cumulation rather than investment, and growth 
rates have fallen below trend levels. The 
problem is not inadequacy of capital, but rather 
the availability of too much of the wrong kind. 
Many specific proposals have been put 
forward since 1974 to address these needs, the 
great majority without success. As long as the 
Eurocurrency market increases by 25% a year, 
and as long as the larger Latin American coun-
tries enjoy favourable access to it, it is difficult 
to generate any sense of urgency. The Wit-
teveen Facility of the I M F is one of the few 
concrete steps taken; it makes available an ad-
ditional US$ 10 billion to compensate for short-
term shortfalls, and we shall probably see 
greater use made of it after this round of oil 
price increases. 
To supplement this facility, however, 
some means of more orderly debt restructuring 
remains necessary. Borrowing to meet im-
mediate foreign exchange needs may avert 
bankruptcy, but it remains inadequate to 
finance the longer-term productive adjust-
ments required. Experience suggest that it is 
precisely those countries already heavily 
overburdened with debt that repeatedly re-
quire emergency assistance. It would be better 
policy to facilitate a really fresh start than to 
engage in unrealistic roll-overs that merely 
stretch out very high service payments over a 
longer interval. Commercial banks are reluc-
tant to write off foreign loans, although one 
presumes that the high risk premiums charged 
provide a financial reserve for doing so. They 
had no similar compunction with real estate 
investment trusts —despite larger losses— 
because a legal code of bankruptcy made 
settlement desirable. I continue to believe 
that international lending would benefit from 
a similar escape clause. Clear applications in 
Latin America would have been Chile and 
Peru. 
Such a provision would not grant a license 
for irresponsible conduct by borrowing coun-
tries. They would have to pay the cost of failing 
to meet their obligations through less future 
access to the capital market, and moreover 
they could not default without establishing 
their need for such relief to the satisfaction of, 
say, the IMF. There would be a chilling effect 
on the willingness of commercial banks to 
lend directly for the short term, and some 
impact on interest costs. That would not be all 
bad, even when one is quite correctly con-
cerned about the adequacy of capital flows. 
Reliance on short-term borrowing probably 
should be discouraged —particularly if its 
results are as mixed as those of recent years. 
Furthermore, such a measure would cor-
rectly shift attention to the more fundamental 
need to make external resources available for 
productive longer-term investment. Such a 
need will be met only by increasing the pool 
of funds available for borrowing at extended 
maturities. One means of doing so is to enhance 
the role of the public development banks 
relative to the private commercial banks. 
Recent increases in the capital base of the 
World Bank and of the Inter-American Bank, 
and co-participations, clearly contribute to this 
end. More dramatic measures may be neces-
sary, however, including explicit solicitation 
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the capacity to utilize exchange rate devalua-
tion in a heavily indebted economy. The 
impact upon external liabilities does not have 
an even incidence upon sectors or firms. To 
offset it is to negate the attempt at reducing 
domestic expenditure, while to permit the 
financial consequences may be to invite seri-
ous displacements in production. One may 
therefore be forced into a situation of using 
selective measures to offset overvaluation 
rather than altering the exchange rate itself. 
Latin America's rising participation in the 
international capital market in the last decade 
reflects on the whole its gathering economic 
strength. Higher levels of income, apparent 
political stability, a facility to increase and 
diversify exports, and attractive future pros-
pects are responsible for the differential access 
to the Eurocurrency market enjoyed by the 
principal countries of the region. That access 
has enabled many of those countries to protect 
themselves against the worst consequences of a 
much more sluggish and uncertain world econ-
omy since 1974. 
Integration into international capital mar-
kets has not worked equally well for all, 
however, nor has it worked perfectly for any 
country. Peru remains saddled with a debt that 
exceeds its capacity to pay. Mexico's under-
developed fiscal capacity has been compen-
sated —through good fortune— by the timely 
discovery and exploitation of petroleum and 
natural gas. Brazil has embarked upon a stop-
go policy in recent years reminiscent of its 
neighbours to the south. Some smaller coun-
tries have not been able to borrow readily or 
on favourable terms. 
Capital inflows thus have not been a 
panacea, and they threaten to become a prob-
lem if they prematurely turn to outflows of 
real resources. If they are to recover their 
recent high growth rates, the countries of the 
region must be able to count on adequate 
continuing finance. Whether the private mar-
ket, and the increasing concentration of com-
mercial bank debt, can satisfy that need is 
The essentia] point is that reliance upon 
external capital inflows is not an unmixed 
blessing. Effective management of the debt 
involves more than a computer print-out of 
projected amortization and interest payments. 
It involves the internal allocation of resources, 
the relationship with internal capital markets, 
and the synchronization of policy instruments. 
These tasks are complicated by uncertain con-
ditions of supply determined externally. 
doubtful. Uncertain and short-term borrowing 
does not translate efficiently into the long-
term process of capital accumulation and 
sustained growth that is desirable. Stabiliza-
tion packages that meet symptomatic excesses 
of domestic absorption by imposing unreal-
istically short adjustment periods do not ad-
dress structural deficiencies. 
Many specific proposals have been ad-
vanced to deal with one or another of these 
problems. Few have been seriously consid-
ered, because there is little sense of urgency. 
So long as modest product growth is sustained, 
debt obligations are met, and continuing capi-
tal is available, it will be difficult to arouse 
keen interest in suggested reforms to improve 
intermediation. Innovation in international 
financial markets seems to be dominated by 
private initiative rather than public policy. The 
danger is not that the financial markets will 
suddenly collapse, or that Latin American 
debtors will all find themselves unable to pay, 
but that the status quo will continue, with 
adequate, and indeed perhaps excessive avail-
ability of credit of the wrong kind. 
The countries of Latin America are not 
entirely dependent upon the initiatives of 
others in responding to this real, if undramatic, 
threat. They can reduce their borrowing and 
rely more substantially upon national savings; 
they can engage more vigorously in a style of 
development directed to the internal market; 
they can insulate themselves to a greater 
extent against world economic circumstances. 
Such a strategy is not costless, either for Latin 
Conclusions 
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America or the industrialized countries, for it 
involves a rejection of the mutual advantages 
inherent in a rational transfer of resources to 
more productive applications. 
Yet that outcome may well occur, because 
policies are slow to evolve. Few trends have 
been foreseen with such monotonous regular-
ity as the altered importance, needs, and role 
ofthe middle-income countries of Latin Ameri-
ca. Up to now, we have successfully muddled 
through. But can we confidently rely on such 
an accommodation in the future? 
